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 1 
Summary 
We live an increasingly larger part of our lives online. The Internet has 
fundamentally changed how we find information, buy products, connect 
with friends and find entertainment such as video streaming and digital 
distribution of books. The Internet has changed the competitive landscape 
for many markets. Local sellers suddenly face competition from sellers 
around the globe, introducing more choice and added transparency. Online 
marketplaces, such as E-bay or Amazon, have more or less erased the 
former geographical barriers and lowered search costs for consumers. The 
emergence of new markets, such as Internet search and online retail, that 
largely operates new business models focused on monetizing user data with 
advertisements whilst providing their service for ‘free’ to the consumer 
might make established competition enforcement tools difficult to use. 
Personalisation might blur transparency and make for a new kind of abusive 
behaviour, sorting consumer into separate markets based on personal data 
such as purchasing history and recent web searches. The recently released 
decision by the Commission in the Google Shopping case provide an insight 
into where competition law is moving in an online market environment. 
However, the Commissions decision provides far more questions than 
answers, especially when the principles of that decision is applied to the 
hypothetical case of Amazon’s online market. The look into Amazons 
online marketplace also hints towards the existence of a new type of abusive 
behaviour, where Amazon curates consumer choice within its marketplace 
with the possibility to deny its sellers competition on the merits of their 
offerings and its consumers of transparency. The thesis comes to the 
conclusion that reform is needed to bring legal certainty to this area of 
business and that perhaps the most powerful competition enforcement tool 
of the future is the General Data Protection Regulation. 
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Sammanfattning 
Vi lever en allt större del av våra liv online. Internet har i grunden förändrat 
hur vi söker information, köper produkter, interagerar med vänner och 
konsumerar underhållning såsom streamingtjänster och digital distribution 
av böcker. Internet har förändrat konkurrenslandskapet för många 
marknader. Lokala säljare står plötsligt inför konkurrens från säljare runt om 
i världen som bidrar med fler val och ökad transparens. Online-
marknadsplatser, som E-bay och Amazon, har mer eller mindre raderat 
geografiska handelshinder och sänkt konsumenternas sökkostnader. 
Framväxten av nya marknader, som Internet-sök och online-detaljhandel, 
som i stor utsträckning bygger på nya affärsmodeller där tjänsten är ‘gratis’ 
för konsumenten och betalas av riktad annonsering, kan göra det svårt att 
använda etablerade konkurrensverktyg. Individanpassade tjänster kan 
obstruera transparens genom att sortera konsumenter i separata marknader 
baserat på personuppgifter, såsom köphistorik och surfvanor. Det nyligen 
offentliggjorda beslutet från EU-kommissionen i Google Shopping-fallet ger 
en inblick i vart konkurrenslagstiftningen är på väg för internetbaserade 
marknader. Beslutet ger emellertid fler frågor än svar, särskilt när 
principerna från beslutet tillämpas på ett hypotetiskt fall baserat på 
Amazons onlinemarknadsplats för konsumentvaror. Undersökningen av 
Amazon tyder också på att det kan finnas en ny typ av dominansmissbruk, 
där Amazon kurerar vilka varor som lyfts fram på sin marknadsplats, med 
risk att snedvrida konkurrensen mellan säljare och erbjuda en lägre grad av 
transparens för konsumenter. Examensarbetet landar I slutsatsen att reform 
är nödvändig för att skapa rättssäkerhet för onlinebaserade marknader och 
att kanske det framtida mest effektiva konkurrenshanteringsverktyget för 
framtiden är den allmänna dataskyddsförordningen. 
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1 Introduction  
The Internet revolution has fundamentally changed how buyers and sellers 
connect.1 It has challenged geographical market definitions, reduced search 
costs, lowered entry barriers and provided consumers and businesses with a 
seemingly endless supply of information and choice. Consumers can buy 
groceries, rent a movie, buy a new car and insurance for it, book plane 
tickets and buy that vintage Ghostbusters collectable figure from the 
comfort of their own home.2 In essence, by being able to find the best price 
for almost any object, and having it shipped to your location, the local seller 
is now exposed to the competition from a seller of the same item located in 
the next town, or Hong Kong, or virtually anywhere around the globe.3  
The online marketplace has increased competition since sellers from around 
the globe congregate on platforms like Ebay or Amazon and compete for the 
sale. The online marketplace is also helping consumers to reduce search 
costs. Economic theory indicates that high search costs will likely lead to 
increased market power for sellers, at the expense of product quality and 
price.4 When the search cost becomes too high in relation to the price of the 
goods, quality no longer becomes a factor and consumers are more likely to 
buy sub-par items at premium prices and in that sense reduce consumer 
welfare.5 Price comparisons between many different retailers can be done 
with the aid of an online price comparison website, or just simply browsing 
the webpages of a few outlets for a specific good as opposed to physically 
having to move from store to store before making a purchase. One thing that 
is easy to forget when comparing modern price comparison websites to the 
                                                
1 A. Ezrachi, M.E. Stucke, Harvard 2016, Virtual competition, p. 1. 
2 See for instance Amazon.com, netflix.com, kvd.se, pricerunner.com, trivago.com and 
ebay.com. 
3 A good example of this is using the search term ”Kyosho pull start” on ebay.com. 
https://www.ebay.com/sch/i.html?_odkw=kyosho+pull+stat&_osacat=0&_from=R40&_trk
2 See f r instance Amazon.com, netflix.com, kvd.se, pricerunner.com, trivago.  and 
ebay.com. 
3 A good example of this is using the search term ”Kyosho pull start” on ebay.com. 
https://www.ebay.com/sch/i.html?_odkw=kyosho+pull+stat&_osacat=0&_from=R40&_trk
sid=p2045573.m570.l1313.TR0.TRC0.H0.Xkyosho+pull+start.TRS0&_nkw=kyosho+pull
+start&_sacat=0 
4 See for instance R. Thaler, 1980, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1, 
Toward a positive theory of consumer choice, Page 50, section 5. Read at: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.454.6386&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
5 A. Ezrachi, M.E. Stucke, Harvard 2016, Virtual competition, p. 5. 
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old method of moving from store to store to find the best deal for a certain 
item, is that most price comparison websites are essentially businesses that 
in themselves needs funding to operate and to be profitable enough to last. 
This might be problematic from a consumer transparency perspective where 
these businesses might choose to promote goods or services from which 
they receive more revenue. The online marketplace might also provide 
challenges to competition regulation, where the classic tools, such as the 
small but significant transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test might be 
ineffective, and a market situation where geographical constraints may no 
longer be relevant as services are offered at no monetary cost to the user and 
sellers can reach the globe with their products.6 This thesis revolves around 
the issues that arise in online environments where established tools to assess 
markets might be difficult to use, which might lead to some unexpected 
outcomes. 
 
 
                                                
6 See chapter 3.3.1 for more on the SSNIP test. 
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2 Research questions, scope of 
this thesis, materials and 
research method 
 
2.1 Purpose and research questions  
Ever since the Internet made its debut as a place for businesses in the mid 
90’s it has become an increasingly important component of our daily 
routines. We consume more services and buy more things online than ever 
before. The emerge of multi sided markets, and the rise of players such as 
Google and Facebook where consumers are serviced for ‘free’ by 
contributing with information about themselves and their consumer patterns, 
allows the market players to influence consumer choices more accurately 
than ever before.7 Online marketplace companies such as Amazon and E-
bay have developed platforms to accurately connect buyers and sellers 
regardless of physical location. These strong online positions, with their 
own set of market rules, could not only be seen as “another retail outlet” but 
new markets in its own right, which may be seen as a powerful market 
position from a competition law perspective. With great power there must 
also come great responsibility, and with the power to effectively connect 
consumers to different products or services these platforms have tremendous 
leverage regarding what articles, advertisements, products and information 
that reaches the consumer.8 This raises the question whether established 
competition policy at the European Union level is fit to tackle possible 
competition infringements that may arise from such powerful market 
positions. 
                                                
7 Multi sided markets refer to markets that serve two different categories of customers 
simultaniously, such as the market for video gaming consoles in which market participants 
need to attract consumers to get developers to creat games for their console and at the same 
time develop games to attract consumers. 
8 S. Lee, S. Ditko 1962, Amazing Fantasy #15, Spider man comic, p. 13, last panel 
narrative. Available at http://readcomiconline.to/Comic/Amazing-Fantasy-15-Spider-
Man/Full?id=62737#13  as of 2018-05-21. 
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The main focus of this thesis is to examine how competition regulation 
applies to online businesses and to what extent the tools commonly used to 
assess abuse of dominance under article 102 TFEU (102) can be deemed 
effective in an increasingly complex digital economy. 
 
2.2 Scope of this thesis 
Since the purpose of this thesis is to examine competition policy in relation 
to market power I have chosen to only include application of article 102. I 
have chosen to limit the scope of this thesis to include Google and 
Amazon.com only. I look specifically at Google due to the fact that the 
Commission recently released its decision to fine Google for abuse of a 
dominant position in the market for general Internet search, which may 
indicate how this area of law is expected to develop. Amazon will serve as a 
hypothetical case study against which the findings from the Google 
Shopping Case can be applied in an attempt to assess how the Commission 
reasoning from the Google case might affect other online businesses in 
similar positions. 
 
2.3 Materials and methods 
For this thesis I have chosen to include materials regarding EU competition 
law only. The Commissions guidelines on various aspects of application of 
competition law are a key source as well as the Commission’s decision in 
the Google Shopping Case. However, there is little literature available on 
this specific topic. Most literature tend to either assess competition issues in 
relation to mergers such as the Google/DoubleClick merger or discusses 
plausible challenges for competition law in this area.9 This might not come 
as a surprise as the Commissions decision on the Google Shopping Case is 
expected to be indicative on where competition law is going in this area.  
                                                
9 Such as A. Ezrachi, M.E. Stucke’s Virtual competition used extensively in the 
introduction. 
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This thesis deals first and foremost with EU policy issues and questions 
regarding application of EU competition policy. For that reason I have been 
leaning on EU-law method as described by Korling & Zamboni. The 
European Union is an organization, which has capacity to enact law and 
issue binding decisions at many levels, such as the EU parliament, the 
courts and soft law by decisions from the Commission.10 Although the 
Commissions decisions are not binding per se, they are considered 
indicative on what is considered legal, especially in competition law.11 I will 
also apply a critical perspective to the Commissions decision in chapter five, 
analysing and comparing it in the light of established EU-case law and 
competition legislation. In this sense I will make use of analytical methods 
described in Claes Sandgren’s “Rättsvetenskap för uppsatsförfattare”.12 
                                                
10 F. Korling, M. Zamboni, 2015, Juridisk Metodlära, P. 115. 
11 F. Korling, M. Zamboni, 2015, Juridisk Metodlära, P. 127. 
12 C. Sandgren, 2016, Rättsvetenskap för uppsatsförfattare, 3:rd edition, chapter 6.4. 
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3 Competition regulation in the 
EU 
 
Competition has always been an important part of the European Union, and 
a logical necessity of the single market policy. It is widely accepted that 
goods and services are produced more efficiently in competition with others 
offering the same, or similar goods and services.13 Competition arises 
naturally when there are more manufacturers of a product than consumers, 
and they must offer additional consumer benefits in order to attract 
customers. Examples of such an advantage may be an improved 
manufacturing process, which leads to a lower price that increases the 
competitiveness of the product and leads consumers to prefer that product 
instead of another that can fulfil the same needs. This forces other 
manufacturers to streamline their operations or find other means of 
competition in order to remain competitive. The competition legislation 
itself is contained in Articles 101 and 102 of the EU Treaty and has further 
developed in practice.14 In short, all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the internal 
market are prohibited.15 Furthermore, one or more companies' abuse of 
dominance in the internal market or in a substantial part of this is 
prohibited.16 The primary objective for EU competition law is to maximise 
efficiency in the common market in terms of consumer welfare and 
allocation of resources.17  
                                                
13 See for instance S. Bishop, M. Walker, 2002, Sweet & Maxwell, The Economics of EC 
competition law, chapter 2. 
14 The legislation is available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/SV/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT 
15 EU Treaty, article 101. 
16 EU Treaty, article 102 
17 P. Craig, G. De Búrca, Oxford, 2015, EU LAW, text, cases and materials, 6th edition, s. 
1001. 
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3.1 The overall goal for competition 
regulation 
There have been some uncertainties on how to interpret the concept 
consumer welfare in relation to EU competition policy.18 One could 
certainly argue that consumer welfare is achieved if consumers in general 
are happy with any price that they feel brings value for their money. The 
general definition of consumer welfare is described in some circles as “the 
maximisation of consumer surplus, which is the part of total surplus given to 
consumers”.19 This definition only encapsulates the term “surplus” without 
narrowing it down. “Surplus” could be interpreted as time, funds or any 
other quantitative concept. The Commission, however, suggests that 
consumer welfare is achieved when competition leads to “lower prices, 
better quality and a wider choice of new and improved goods and 
services”.20 The main beneficiary of EU competition law is the consumer, in 
terms of transferring wealth from producers to consumers. This overall goal 
for EU competition policy is also clear in the Guidelines on the application 
of article 81(3) [101(3)] of the Treaty which states that; “The aim of the 
Community competition rules is to protect competition on the market as a 
means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient 
allocation of resources. Agreements that restrict competition may at the 
same time have pro-competitive effects by way of efficiency gains. 
Efficiencies may create additional value by lowering the cost of producing 
an output, improving the quality of the product or creating a new 
product.”21 This consumer welfare approach to competition regulation 
factors in equity considerations, like distribution of resources, rather than 
solely focusing on market efficiency, which would be the case if total 
welfare approach to competition was used.22 A “total welfare” consideration 
                                                
18 K. J. Cseres, Kluwer law 2005, Competition Law and Consumer Protection p. 251. 
19 Citation, K. J. Cseres, Kluwer law 2005, Competition Law and Consumer Protection p. 
20. 
20 Guidance on the commission’s enforcement priorities in article 82 (102) of the EC treaty  
to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, note 5.  
21 Commissions Guidelines on the application of article 81(3) of the Treaty (2004/C 
101/08). 
22 K. J. Cseres, Kluwer law 2005, Competition Law and Consumer Protection, p. 22. 
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does not factor in who the main beneficiary is, as long as more value is 
produced with fewer resources.23 It also means that some anti competitive 
practices can be tolerated if they are beneficial to the consumer. This overall 
objective is important to have in mind when addressing the Google 
Shopping Case analysis in chapter 4.4 of this thesis. 
 
In the context of this thesis it is also important to recognize that “consumer 
welfare” and “consumer harm” are in no way fixed definitions as such. Even 
though the Commission appear to have defined “consumer welfare” as the 
transfer of wealth to the consumer trough competition, the European Data 
Protection Supervisor suggested that violation of data protection rights 
should be included in the concept “consumer harm” in the context of 
European competition policy.24 This thesis will focus on the characteristics 
and application of article 102 from now on. 
 
3.2 Scope of article 102 
In order to better understand the competition challenges of the online 
marketplace it is important to understand the current application of article 
102, and its current limits. There are limits to the application of article 102. 
The anti-competetive conduct must be carried out by an “undertaking”. The 
term “undertaking” is not defined in the treaties but has been given such a 
broad definition in EU case law that it effectively covers all forms of 
meaningful economic activity.25 The territorial scope of the article is the 
territory of EU’s member states. However, there has been some 
extraterritorial application of the articles in some cases, including cases 
where the anti-competitive behaviour originated from areas outside the EU 
but where there is an effect on competition within the union.26 The main 
                                                
23 K. J. Cseres, Kluwer law 2005, Competition Law and Consumer Protection, p. 21 
24 EDPS, 2014 ”privacy and competitveness in the age of big data”, p.31-32. 
25 R. O’Donoghue, J. Padilla, Hart 2013, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 
2’n edition, p. 14, section 1.3.2.1 
26 R. O’Donoghue, J. Padilla, Hart 2013, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 
2’n edition, p. 15, section 1.3.1, see also cases T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission and 
COMP/37.990 Intel, Commission decision of 13 May 2009. 
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function of article 102 is control over market power. Market power can be 
understood as the degree of care that market participants must take in 
relation to its competitors while operating. In the ECJs words; “The 
dominant position referred to in this article relates to a position of 
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers”.27 An undertaking 
with high market power can act more or less without considering what the 
competitors might do, leading to a monopoly like situation which tend to 
lead to higher prices and lower quality than under competitive conditions, 
thus reducing consumer welfare. An important feature of the application of 
article 102 is that market power is not forbidden per se, it is the abuse of 
market power that is prohibited. It would be strange if successful firms, 
which by the introduction of superior products at competitive prices were 
prohibited to attain market power on these conditions. The established 
assessment of market power under article 102 requires the definition of the 
relevant market, and subcategories relevant product market and relevant 
geographical market.  
3.3 Relevant market 
The relevant market is highly dependent on the objective and circumstances 
in each situation where article 102 might be applicable.28 The relevant 
market generally includes all products or services which are regarded to be 
in competition with each other.29 The principal characteristic of competition 
in is interchange ability between products by consumers. All products that 
can fulfil the same consumer need is generally considered to be competing 
in the same relevant market. 
  
                                                
27 C-27/76, United brands, note 65, p. 277 
28 Commission Notice on market definition, paragraph 10. 
29 OECD Roundtable On Market Definition, June 2012, p.10, note 1. 
 13 
 When assessing the relevant market there are three basic principles that 
govern the assessment:30 
- Demand side substitutability 
- Supply side substitutability 
- Potential competition. 
However, the Commission puts emphasis on its open approach to evidence 
when assessing relevant markets and stresses that it does not follow a rigid 
hierarchy of different sources for or types of evidence.31 
 
3.3.1 Demand side substitutability 
Demand side substitutability refers to a range of products that might be 
substitutable by consumers given a small but permanent relative increase in 
price (SSNIP) of the goods and areas being considered.32 If the consumers 
would move to other products in response to the increased price, those 
products are deemed substitutable and thus included in the relevant product 
market. The commission states that  “a relevant product market comprises 
all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable 
or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, 
their prices and their intended use”.33 The analysis usually factors in utility, 
price but also “soft” product characteristics such as texture and taste or other 
qualities such as Internet uplink capacity.34 Assessment of demand side 
substitutability relies heavily on price as the main factor for when 
consumers either switch products, or in the United Brands case, stops 
buying the product.35 Considering that many of the online services are 
essentially free to use for the consumer, or at least have no monetary cost, 
                                                
30 Commission Notice on market definition, paragraph 13. 
31 Commission Notice on market definition, paragraph 26. 
32 See OECD Roundtable On Market Definition, June 2012, p.31. and R. O’Donoghue, J. 
Padilla, Hart 2013, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 2’n edition, p. 110, 
section 3.3.2.1. Henceforth referred to as the SSNIP test, small but significant non 
transitory increase in price. 
33 Commission Notice on market definition, paragraph 7. 
34 See C-27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v 
Commission, note 34 and Case T-340/03 France Télécom SA v Commission 2007 ECR II-
107, note 88. 
35 Commission Notice on market definition, paragraph 19. 
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can make the SSNIP test for assessing relevant market difficult to use since 
price is not a factor for consumer behaviour. 
3.3.2 Supply side substitutability 
Supply side substitutability may also be a factor when assessing the relevant 
market. Supply side substitutability refers to the situation where suppliers 
are able to switch production to the relevant products at short notice with no 
significant costs or risks in response to a small and permanent change in 
relative prices.36 The commission uses the paper industry to illustrate how 
this might come to play, as paper is manufactured in a wide range of 
qualities for different uses (consider the paper used for billboard adverts in 
relation to paper towels). However, paper plants can be easily adjusted to 
produce different kinds of paper at short notice and with negligible costs, 
thus being able to compete in many different demand side markets for 
paper.37 The ability to do so typically puts all kinds of paper in the same 
market despite the obvious differences in demand side substitutability. In 
order to asses supply side substitutability its is necessary to answer the 
following questions:38 
- What production-, distribution- and marketing assets are needed to 
produce the relevant product? 
- Do other suppliers possess these assets? 
- Can the assets be acquired without significant, irreversible new 
investment?   
In the area of business covered by this thesis, production and distribution 
tools are essentially software, which can be shaped to almost any product 
with varying development efforts. This may limit the application of supply 
side substitution as a tool to assess the relevant market. It is also unclear 
how supply side substitution would apply to multi sided markets and 
markets that rely on network effects. There are indications that the use of 
                                                
36 Commission Notice on market definition, paragraph 12. 
37 Commission Notice on market definition, paragraph 22. 
38  A. J. Padilla, 2001, The role of Supply Side Substitution in the Definition of the 
Relevant Market in Merger Control, Page 35, paragraph 2. 
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single sided market tools in multi sided market settings can lead to very 
narrow market definitions.39  
 
3.3.3 Potential Competition 
Potential competition is a condition generally assessed after the relevant 
product markets have been found. This assessment greatly depends on the 
relevant product market and the conditions under which potential 
competition would constitute a competitive restraint.40 This could refer to 
barriers of entry, such as high entry costs or in the case with Google 
Shopping, the advantage Google has over its competitors in terms of 
knowledge about its users, its different array of additional services and its 
overall market position.41  
 
3.3.4 Geographical dimension 
The relevant market is always defined in a geographical context. The ECJ 
has defined the relevant geographical market to be “the territory in which all 
traders operate in the same conditions of competition in so far as concerns 
specifically the relevant products”.42 The assessment of what constitutes the 
relevant geographical market is highly dependable on the product at hand.43 
The relevant geographical market in absence of any special provisions is 
generally the EU as a whole. 
 
                                                
39 R. O’Donoghue, J. Padilla, Hart 2013, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 
2’n edition, p. 139, section 3.5.4, paragraph 4. 
40 Commission Notice on market definition, paragraph 24. 
41 Daly. A, Hart 2016, ”Private power, Online Information Flows and EU Law: Mind the 
Gap, page 75. 
42 T-83/91 Tetra Pak vs Commission, note 91. 
43 For instance, in the decisions by the commission 82/861 Brittish Telecommunications the 
relevant market for message- forwarding was Great Britan and in 88/518 Napier Brown-
British Shugar the relevant geographical market was limited by transport costs. 
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3.3.5 Dominant or not? 
After finding the relevant product- and geographical market comes the 
assessment of dominance. Establishing dominance is an essential pre-
requisite under article 102. Dominance is not per se forbidden, but there can 
be no abuse of dominance regardless of any anti-competitive conduct.44 
Dominance can generally not be assessed mechanically. Dominance and 
market power is not absolute terms, they are always a matter of degree 
which will depend of the circumstances in each case.45 The Commission and 
the EU courts emphasizes that an undertaking’s ability to act independently 
of its competitors must be assessed in the light of all relevant 
circumstances.46 A good starting point for the assessment of dominance is 
the distribution of market shares in the relevant market.47 Assigning market 
shares by examining volume or value data will be sufficient in most cases.48 
However, the Commission recognizes that market shares are not conclusive 
evidence of dominance and as such cannot replace proper investigation of 
market conditions.49 There are some generally accepted market share 
indicators that could point towards dominance. Market shares in excess of 
70% are considered to raise a strong presumption of dominance, market 
shares between 50-70% makes the presumption weaker and shares between 
40-50% generally need close examination of the facts in order to assess 
dominance.50 The market shares of rivals are also a factor to consider when 
assessing dominance. A difference in market shares greater than 20% 
between the largest undertaking and the second largest indicates that 
                                                
44 R. O’Donoghue, J. Padilla, Hart 2013, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 
2’n edition, p. 141, section 4.1, paragraph 1. 
45 R. O’Donoghue, J. Padilla, Hart 2013, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 
2’n edition, p. 143, section 4.2.1, paragraph 1, 
46 See C-27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV vs 
Commission, note 66-67. 
47 Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, note 14 
48 R. O’Donoghue, J. Padilla, Hart 2013, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 
2’n edition, p. 144, paragraph 2. 
49 Commissions guideance on enforcement priorities in applying article 82 (102) of the EC 
treaty to abusive exculusionary conduct by dominant undertakings. 
50 R. O’Donoghue, J. Padilla, Hart 2013, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 
2’n edition, p. 147, paragraph 2 
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dominance is more likely than in other situations.51 Undertakings who’s 
market shares approaches a near-monopoly situation, usually over 90%, has 
been described as “superdominant”.52 The rationale being that such 
undertakings has a particular obligation not to abuse their dominance. This 
view has gained some acceptance in following case law but can be debated 
since article 102 does not correspond levels of dominance to responsibility. 
The same legal principles applies to a dominant undertaking regardless of 
conduct, although it might be easier to show anti-competitive effects in 
markets which operates as near-monopolies.53 
 
3.4 Abusive behaviour 
The Commission has identified four specific forms of abusive behaviour in 
its guidelines. These are exclusive dealing, tying and bundling, predation 
and refusal to supply/margin squeeze.54 For the sake of this thesis I have 
chosen to only include the refusal to supply situation and various price 
discrimination practises, including tying, bundling and predation since these 
practises are the ones that best applies to the cases in chapter four and five. 
3.4.1 Refusal to supply 
This form of abuse of dominance typically has the dominant firm refusing to 
supply customers with product A unless the customer behaves in a certain 
way. This typically can be the case where the dominant firm also competes 
on a downstream market.55 This can be illustrated with the joint cases 6 and 
7/73 Istituto Chemioterapicio Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents vs 
Commission, where Commercial Solvents Corporation (CSC) produced a 
                                                
51 R. O’Donoghue, J. Padilla, Hart 2013, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 
2’n edition, p. 150, paragraph 2 
52 Opinion of Advocat General Fennelly in Joined cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, 
Comagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA, Compagnie maritime belge SA abd Dafra-Lines 
A/S vs Commission. 
53 R. O’Donoghue, J. Padilla, Hart 2013, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 
2’n edition, p. 208, paragraph 4 
54 Commissions guideance on enforcement priorities in applying article 82 (102) of the EC 
treaty to abusive exculusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, notes 32-90. 
55 Commissions guideance on enforcement priorities in applying article 82 (102) of the EC 
treaty to abusive exculusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, note 76. 
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raw material used by downstream firm Zoja who used the materials to make 
products. When CSC raised the price to Zoja it found an alternative supply 
for the raw material. This source eventually dried up and when Zoja asked 
to buy the raw materials from CSC it refused to supply, stating that it had 
entered Zojas market and could not provide enough raw material for its own 
and Zojas need. The ECJ found that by refusing to supply Zoja CSC 
effectively eliminated competition in the downstream market for the 
finished product. Another interesting case regarding refusal to supply is the 
Commission decision regarding Microsoft and abuse of dominance.56 In the 
late 90’s Microsoft was regarded to be in a dominant position for PC 
operating systems with its software Microsoft Windows. It used this 
dominance to control other markets, such as the market for media players, 
which at the time was composed by other software vendors offerings. 
Microsoft refused to allow access to certain APIs that limited the 
competitors possibilities to integrate with the Microsoft Windows operating 
system, giving its own windows media player a significant advantage. This 
case also relates to the Essential Facilities Doctrine which is the idea that an 
owner of a facility which is not easily replicated, and competition on a 
market is seriously limited without access to that facility, has to provide 
access to that facility to its rivals.57 In the case with Microsoft, the facility 
was the API’s necessary for integrating a media player into the operating 
system Microsoft Windows.58 Refusing to supply access to these API’s 
would effectively eliminate competition in these markets. The impact of the 
essential facilities doctrine has been limited in later decisions. The Court of 
First instance in both the ENS and Bronner cases held that there has to be no 
real or potential substitute to an essential facility to be considered 
necessary.59 
 
                                                
56 Case COMP/C- 3/37.792 Microsoft. 
57 See OECD roundtable on The Essential Facilities Concept, 1996, p. 8. 
58 For more case law regarding essential facilities see C-241 and 242/91 and T-70/89. 
59 P. Craig, G. De Búrca, Oxford, 2015, EU LAW, text, cases and materials, 6th edition, p. 
1076. Cases T-374, 375, 384 and 388/94 European Night Services LTD (ENS) vs 
Commission, C-7/97 Bronner. 
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3.4.2 Price discrimination 
The concept of price discrimination covers many different practises, all 
revolving around the price and cost of items and services. It may be 
geographical, that is charging different prices in different local markets 
while restricting inter-market competition. Selling the same product at 
different prices with no relation to cost or selling the same cost product at 
different prices are all examples of price discrimination. Different kinds of 
rebates or product ties are another form of price discrimination.60 Predatory 
pricing and selective pricing refers to the practise where a firm uses its 
profits in one market where its dominant to sell its products or services in 
another market well below production costs in order to eliminate 
competition in that market.61 Price discrimination also typically divides into 
two categories. Primary-line injury refers to the harm suffered by a 
competitor at the same level as the dominant firm while second-line injury 
refers to harm suffered by the purchaser of the product. To determine if 
there is price discrimination in a particular market there must be some 
assessment of production costs, which may be difficult to assess when the 
price of the offered service is zero. Increased market transparency can act as 
a countermeasure to price discrimination. When buyers can access 
information on how they can be entitled to certain rebates, or has knowledge 
of production costs or if the price of a certain good or service is widely 
known, buyers are typically in a better position to negotiate which in turn 
leads to lower prices thus promoting consumer welfare. 
 
3.5 Competition and personalisation 
The commission has recognized that greater transparency is needed for 
consumers to understand how the information presented to them is shaped 
                                                
60 P. Craig, G. De Búrca, Oxford, 2015, EU LAW, text, cases and materials, 6th edition, p. 
1077. 
61 P. Craig, G. De Búrca, Oxford, 2015, EU LAW, text, cases and materials, 6th edition, p. 
1082.  
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or personalised in the context of online marketplaces.62 Online markets are 
typically multi-sided meaning that they typically serve two distinct groups 
of customers, such as advertisers on one hand and consumers on the other. 
Consumers are often part of the product, or instrumental in improving the 
product.63 For example, online giant Amazon recognizes that “information 
about our customers is a important part of our business and we are not in 
the business of selling it to others”.64 Amazon also states that that they use 
information to, amongst other things, “communicate with you about orders, 
products, services, and promotional offers, update our records and generally 
maintain your accounts with us, display content such as wish lists and 
consumer reviews and recommended merchandise and services that might 
be of interest to you”65. While this might not be surprising to the consumer, 
Amazon clearly labels different parts of the website “Because you viewed”, 
“Other users bought” and so on, providing some degree of transparency, 
there is no way for the consumer to assess what products and/or prices 
Amazon does not display. A fair question in relation to this is to what extent 
the consumer expects amazon to find the best deal for an item, and in what 
pieces of information amazon factors in when presenting its search results. 
Another example of this is Google’s general search engine, which operates 
on at least two different markets.66 The search engine is free to use for 
consumers and monetized by selling ads to businesses based on the search 
keywords that consumers enter. It also uses consumer data from its search to 
constantly improve its ad side of the business. Like Amazon, ads are also 
marked in the search results, but transparency can still be a challenge, not 
only towards its users, but in the sense of not using plausible dominance to 
distort competition for other businesses operating on the Internet. The 
Commission recently fined Google for abuse of its dominance in the market 
                                                
62 COM(2016) 288 Final, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and 
Challenges for Europe, p. 10-11 
63 As is the case with Google Shopping outlined in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
64 Amazon privacy policy, See: 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=footer_privacy?ie=UTF8&n
odeId=201909010, paragraph 5. 
65 Amazon privacy policy, See: 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=footer_privacy?ie=UTF8&n
odeId=201909010. 
66 See www.google.com 
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for general Internet search. This decision will be closely looked into in 
chapter four. 
 
This perspective opens up for a new set of competition problems. The most 
obvious is that an online retailer might not use its dominance to push 
competitors out of business, but to use its knowledge about its customers in 
such a way that it deprives certain customers of certain choices, thus 
distorting competition. This is especially a factor when the online retailer 
functions as a marketplace through which other retailers sell their items side 
by side with items manufactured by the online retailer itself. The online 
marketplace may allow any retailer access to the marketplace to avoid the 
classic problems with market restriction and denial of entry, but it may not 
apply a transparent algorithm when a consumer searches for a particular 
item. This raises the question whether consumers with different preferences 
might constitute different markets. It also raises the question whether the 
consumer might have given the online marketplace, such as Amazon, the 
task to display only the most relevant results to a product search based on 
information that Amazon already knows about the consumer. This could 
constitute a whole new kind of abuse of dominance, which would be 
incredibly hard to assess given that there are, in fact, no baseline result to 
compare other results against. This particular characteristic of 
personalisation can be problematic for the application of competition 
regulation and will be looked more into in the case studies in chapter four 
and five. 
 
 
 22 
4 Case study, Google 
Shopping 
Between 2010 and 2014 the Commission received a number of complaints 
against Google pursuant to article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.67 The 
Commission found in its preliminary assessment of the complaints that 
Google’s business practises that may infringe Article 102 of the Treaty and 
article 54 of the EEA Agreement in four distinct situations.68 However, the 
scope of this thesis is the application of competition law in online retail 
situations thus limiting the analysis of the Google Shopping Case to the first 
of these four points; 
 
- “The favourable treatment, within Googles general search results 
pages, of links to Google’s own specialized search services as 
compared to links to competing specialised search services (“first 
business practise”).”69 
 
Assessing the above issue requires the Commission to define relevant 
product market and relevant geographical market as well as establishing 
dominance and analysing interchange ability without using price as a 
parameter, as often is the case with online search services. 
 
4.1 Background to the Google Shopping 
Case 
Google operates a business model that relies on offering internet search and 
other services, such as e-mail service, maps services, word processing 
services etcetera, to consumers and offering advertising services towards 
businesses from which it generates the main source of revenue.70 The main 
                                                
67 See the Commission decision of 27.6.2017 relating to the proceedings under article 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area (AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping)), henceforth 
”Google Shopping Case”, note 38-70. 
68 Google Shopping Case, note 63. 
69 Google Shopping Case, note 63, p1. 
70 Google Shopping Case, note 7. 
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service that Google offers to its consumers is it’s general search engine that 
allows users to search the Internet for information by entering a keyword or 
a number of keywords.71 This can be done from a number of devices, such 
as personal computers, mobile phones and even through voice activated 
devices such as Google’s Internet connected speaker “Google home”.72 
Regardless of input method, the underlying search engine is basically the 
same and generates similar results.73 When a user enters a keyword into the 
search engine, it runs two sets of search algorithms, one generic and one 
specialised. The generic algorithm ranks pages containing any possible 
content, including pages containing competing specialised search services. 
The specialised algorithm is specifically designed to identify relevant results 
for a particular type of information, such as locations, apparel, electronics 
and so on.74 The search engine returns up to three different categories of 
results comprised into one coherent list that may span one or more pages:75 
- Generic search results, 
- Online search advertisements, 
- Specialised search results. 
It is important for the case to understand the key differences between the 
categories of search results. 
4.1.1 Generic search results 
The generic search results appear on the left side of the search result page 
and are sorted according to their “web rank”.76 The “web rank” relies 
heavily on the PageRank algorithm that is a method developed by Google 
for “rating Web pages objectively and mechanically, effectively measuring 
the human interest and attention devoted to them”.77 The algorithm is based 
on the assumption that more important websites receives more links from 
other websites than less important ones. Google determents this using a 
                                                
71 Google Shopping Case, note 8-9. 
72 See for instance https://store.google.com/us/product/google_home  
73 Google Shopping Case, note 9. 
74 Google Shopping Case, note 10-12. 
75 Google Shopping Case, note 10. 
76 Google Shopping Case, note 14. 
77 S. Brin, L. Page, The PageRank Citation Ranking; Bringing order to the web”, Page 1. 
Available at: http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/422/1/1999-66.pdf, downloaded 23/4 2018. 
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process called crawling, which is essentially constantly scanning the 
Internet for new content and indexing such content on discovery, effectively 
making new content available for the PageRank algorithm.78 Google does 
not charge any fees to either the consumer or the creator of a crawled and 
indexed webpage for this part of its business.79  
 
4.1.2 Online search advertising results 
Depending on what the user used as a search keyword Google might display 
advertisements from its search-advertising platform “AdWords”. These 
appear among the generic search results marked with the term “ad” or 
similar. Anyone can purchase an ad for a specific keyword or phrase 
through Google’s auction based ad business. It is not uncommon for a 
specific keyword to have a number of ads tied to it. The order in which the 
ads appear is determined by their “Ad Rank”, which is a combination of 
how much the advertiser is willing to pay for a click on it’s ad and the ads 
“quality score”.80 Google gets paid for the advertisement every time a user 
clicks on an “AdWord” ad. The “AdWords” business allows advertisers 
who probably would not appear in the generic search results to lead 
consumers to their offerings. Competing specialised search services also 
purchase “AdWords”.81 
 
4.1.3 Specialised search results 
Google operates a number of specialised search services specifically 
designed to search a certain topic, for example Google Flights, Google 
Finance and Google Shopping. When a user enters a search keyword 
Google might display results from it’s specialised search services. These 
results typically appear at the very top of the results page, often coupled 
with an image and a tag that indicates that these results are sponsored or 
                                                
78 Google Shopping Case, note 15-16. 
79 Google Shopping Case, note 17. 
80 Google Shopping Case, note 18-21. 
81 Google Shopping Case, note 22. 
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paid, similar to the marking used in the online search advertising results. 
These results are typically reserved for Google’s business partners and 
websites has to enter into an agreement with Google to be featured in the 
specialised search results. These agreements are typically pay per click, as is 
the case with the specialised search service Google Shopping.82 
 
4.1.4 Google Shopping 
Google has been operating a comparison shopping service in different 
markets and under different names since 2002.83 The service is specialised 
for searching products by offering options to search for product in a specific 
price range in different categories such as electronics, home décor and so 
on.84 In 2012 it changed the name to “Google Shopping” and changed the 
business model of this service to a “paid inclusion” model similar to the 
AdWord business, where the merchant pays Google if the user clicks the 
product displayed in the search results. By clicking on a displayed product 
the user is taken directly to the Google merchant partner’s site where the 
purchase can be made. Since 2012 Google has launched its comparison 
shopping service across most of Europe.85  
 
4.1.5 The main issue 
The commission argues that the generic search results, the online 
advertisement results and the specialised search results essentially are 
different markets, which congregate into one coherent list of search results 
for the end user. By promoting specialised search results from Google 
Shopping on its general search results page and adjusting its “PageRank” 
algorithms to make competing comparison shopping services appear further 
down on the list for organic results, Google is using its dominance on the 
market for general search services to promote its offering on the market for 
                                                
82 Google Shopping Case, note 23-25. 
83 Google Shopping Case, note 27. 
84 See https://www.google.com/shopping?hl=en . 
85 Google Shopping Case, note 31-35 
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comparison shopping services and also reinforcing its dominance on the 
market for general search services, in violation of article 102.86 
 
4.2 The commissions approach to market 
definitions 
4.2.1 Relevant product markets 
The Commission concludes that there are separate markets for general 
search services and comparison shopping services.87 The main reasons for 
this is the alleged limited demand side substitutability, the difference in 
business models and overall objective of these services.88 It argues that 
general search services, although offered for free to the consumer, is an 
economic activity based on the fact that the user contributes to the service 
by providing data with each use of the search engine. In most cases a user 
enters into a contractual relationship with Google, which allows Google to 
store and use that data to improve the quality of the search engine and to 
improve the relevance of its advertising business. The Commission also 
argues that general search engines compete on non-economic factors such as 
relevance of search results, the amount of searched content, user interface 
and speed.89  
 
There is also limited demand side substitutability between general search 
services and content sites such as Wikipedia, IMDb and the likes.90 The 
Commission argues that general search services and content sites serves 
different purposes, describing the former as a service whose objective is to 
lead the user off its website as efficiently as possible and the latter as an end 
destination for a specific type of content. Search services that are embedded 
into content sites are not suited for general Internet search.91 The 
                                                
86 Google Shopping Case, note 589. 
87 Google Shopping Case, note 154. 
88 Google Shopping Case, chapters 5.2 – 5.2.2.5 
89 Google Shopping Case, note 158-160. 
90 See www.wikipedia.com and IMDB, the internet movie database, at www.imdb.com.  
91 Google Shopping Case, notes 163-165. 
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Commission also argues that there is limited demand side substitutability 
between general search services versus specialised search services on the 
merits that specialised search services tend to focus on providing results in a 
narrow field, such as electronics, news and air tickets, compared to the 
general search services.92 They also argue that specialised search services 
tend to rely on information supplied by third parties, such as business 
partners and, and not by crawling and indexing as outlined in 5.1.1.93 
Another key difference is that specialised search services generate revenue 
by other means than running ads, such as paid inclusion or commission on 
sales.94 
 
The commission comes to the conclusion that general search services, 
specialised search services, content sites and merchant platforms are all in 
different product markets. 
 
4.2.2 Relevant gegraphical market 
The commission simply concludes that the relevant geographical markets 
are all national markets in scope for this case.95 
 
4.2.3 The assessment of dominance 
The Commission approaches this assessment in a very broad way, stating 
that this assessment is made on the basis of a number of factors that each 
might not, in itself, be determinative. It mentions the fact that very large 
market shares is a sign of dominance because they tend to give the dominant 
firm a position of strength in relations to its competitors thus providing a 
freedom of action in the relevant market for the dominant firm.96 There is 
little dispute over the fact that Google dominates the market for general 
                                                
92 Google Shopping Case, note 167. 
93 Google Shopping Case, note 168. 
94 Google Shopping Case, note 168. 
95 Google Shopping Case, note 251-252. 
96 Google Shopping Case, note 265-266. 
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search services, with market shares typically reaching over 90% for national 
markets in the EU in the relevant timeframe.97 
 
4.3 Abuse of dominance 
The Commission states that “Dominant undertakings have a special 
responsibility not to impair, by conduct falling outside the scope of 
competition on the merits, genuine undistorted competition in the internal 
market. A system of undistorted competition can be guaranteed only if 
equality of opportunity is secured as between the various economic 
operators”. 98 By curating its PageRank algorithms to promote certain type 
of content Google did distort competition.99 Google however, argues that 
the changes were made to provide its users with more original content and 
less duplicates of the same content being aggregated over a number of 
different webpages, thus leaving the consumer with less available 
information than it otherwise would have had.100  
 
 
4.4 Analysis of the Commissions decision 
It should be noted that the Commission refrains from using any existing 
anti-competitive label, such as refusal to supply, price discrimination or 
denial of market entry on Google’s business practises, nor does it apply 
established competition tools such as the SSNIP101 test to the case. Instead it 
tends point towards Google’s overall dominance in the general search 
market, but the Commission does not seem to view Google’s general 
Internet search as an essential facility.102 One theory for this is that this area 
of business, and its consumers, is moving faster than almost anything else, 
                                                
97 Google Shopping Case, chapter 6.2 
98 Google Shopping Case, Note 331. 
99 Google Shopping Case, Note 341. 
100 Google Shopping Case, Note 358 a-d. 
101 Small but Significant and non-transitory increase in price, see chapter 3.3. 
102 Consider the essential facilities doctrine briefly described in chapter 3.4.1. 
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which means that a service or business practise that was widely used one 
day might be gone in the next. It also highlights the inability for old world 
competition policy tools to properly address competition issues where no 
objective criteria is present, such as price, when it comes down to market 
definitions. Another thing to note is that the Commission fails to address is 
the behaviour of the end consumer it sets out to protect. In the supplied 
evidence the Commission claims that Google’s practice harms the consumer 
because it reduces, or has the potential to reduce choice in the market for 
comparison shopping services. However, the Commission does not factor in 
consumer behaviour in relation to the overall goal for the consumer, which 
must be assumed to get information on and possibly purchase an item or 
service as efficiently as possible. It only addresses this in terms of Internet 
traffic. It also does not take into account that user behaviour regarding how 
the user approaches ads might have an impact on how users react to the 
Google shopping results.  
 
This decision might, in fact, protect a market, which is becoming obsolete as 
other means of finding products become more refined and efficient from a 
consumer perspective.103 The commission does separate the market for 
comparison shopping services and the market for merchant platforms such 
as Amazon, but concerning the overall goal for the consumer this divide 
seems artificial due to the fact that merchant platforms offer most of the 
functionality and range of products as comparison shopping services, but 
also contains purchase and delivery functionality.104 
 
One interpretation of this judgment could be that Google has reached a point 
where it cannot innovate and develop its general search engine without the 
risk of abusing its dominant position in the area of general Internet search. 
Consider the scenario in which Google becomes so good at delivering 
relevant search results that it, in fact, can equip its results page with 
additional filters based on the results? In some ways this is already 
                                                
103 Daly. A, Hart 2016, ”Private power, Online Information Flows and EU Law: Mind the 
Gap, page 78. 
104 Google Shopping Case, note 210. 
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happening with some queries. A search for “Queen Elizabeth” will return, 
apart from the results list populated by AdWord ads and PageRank results, 
an information box to the right of the screen containing information about 
Queen Elizabeth composed by information and images from mainly 
Wikipedia but possibly other websites.105 A search for the movie “Blade 
Runner 2049” returns information from Wikipedia, but also contains a link 
to the trailer on YouTube, another company owned by Google, but not the 
only available video distribution service.106 A search for “IPhone X” will 
populate the same space with offers to buy the device, all marked with the 
word “sponsored”, but a search for the term “IPhone X specs” displays no 
such results at all.  
 
Although the commission might have a point when it claims that adjusting 
the PageRank algorithms to position some search results further down the 
list might indeed impact the amount of traffic those results get. It apparently 
does not have a problem with the function of the PageRank system in 
general, or Google’s overall mission to deliver the most relevant search 
results to its users. As described in section 3.3, a dominant undertaking has 
an obligation to consider the effects on competition, but in the case with 
Google shopping, it remains unclear exactly how Google can act to ensure 
equal competition on the merits of each undertakings strengths and 
weaknesses. The conclusion can only be that the Commission generally 
considers the PageRank algorithm, which powers the “organic” search 
results as objective, even tough it is truly curated by Google alone. This will 
make it exceptionally hard for anyone who is in the business for search to 
figure out in what ways they can develop their search engines to ensure 
undistorted competition among the things it is designed to search for. 
 
The Commission basically says that Google can not promote its own 
comparison shopping service because of the impact that has in the market 
for comparison shopping services. The commission then supplies Internet 
                                                
105 Wikipedia.com is explicitly mentioned in the Google Shopping Decision as a ”content 
site” which is not considered to be substitutable with Googles general internet search. 
106 See for instance www.vimeo.com  
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traffic analysis over time to prove that traffic to the other comparison 
shopping services decreased ever since Google started to promote Google 
Shopping. However, it would probably be equally harmful to comparison 
shopping services as a whole if any of them was to get promoted in a similar 
way, that is if Google implemented an "organic" approach to most relevant 
results from comparison shopping services, yet the Commission does not 
question the way that general search results are ranked and/or curated. The 
Commission tends to accept the AdWord/PageRank business as a whole. 
My main point is that it seems like the effect on consumer welfare, i.e. the 
reduction of choice and the possible foreclosure of certain comparison 
shopping services, could not be avoided even if Google would have 
implemented the comparison shopping service results onto it’s general 
search results page as a pay per click model open for any comparison 
shopping service, just like AdWords. This would be a natural extension of 
the main mission for Google’s general search engine, which is to provide 
the most relevant results to any query. This raises the question if you can 
abuse your dominant position even if you’re not in fact better off while 
doing so. Without a doubt such a scenario would still be abusive to the 
market for comparison shopping services. 
 
After all, Google is the main curator of all three types of search results, 
PageRank, AdWord and the Specialised, which, in the light of the 
Facebook/Cambridge Analytica debacle, might be an even more delicate 
problem.107 The Commissions arguments stays valid as long as Google 
refrains to incorporate features that essentially makes specialised search 
more or less obsolete, and in my opinion that is just a matter of time. 
 
Another key assumption in the assessment of the Google case is that every 
user gets the same results from Google’s general search service, at least 
every user in a particular market. This raises the question if Google was to 
be considered to be abusing its dominant position if it factored in user 
                                                
107 Se Mark Zuckerbergs post on Facebook about the incident at: 
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104712037900071 
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preference in its search results, which is if every search returned a slightly 
different result based on the vast amount of data Google has on each of its 
users. This is managed by the different sorting options, such as price, in 
today’s comparison shopping services. To be able to define behaviour as 
abusive one reasonably has to be able to point to a behaviour that is not 
abusive. Lets say that Google did not position its Shopping service among 
its search results as a business practise, but because the user told it to, or 
because it displayed the most relevant result in return to it’s query. There is 
also the issue on search results that isn’t returned to the user as text on a 
screen but by other means, such as the case with voice assistants, which 
limits the amount of information that can be returned to the user and where 
ranking might have an even larger impact on consumer choice. 
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5 Beyond Google Shopping 
In the wake of the Google Shopping case, other online businesses might 
consider the impact this ruling may have on their own operations. In this 
chapter I will try to apply the lessons learned by the Google Shopping case 
on online shopping giant Amazon.com, who share some similarities with 
Google in terms of size, multi-market operations, the use of user data as a 
means for business and the use of a search engine as a starting point for their 
customers. For the purpose of this thesis I will assume that the relevant 
product market is online retail, and that the relevant geographical market is 
every national market across the European Union. 
5.1 What is Amazon.com 
Amazon operates businesses in a number of areas globally. Their prime 
objective is online retail, connecting buyers and sellers of primarily 
consumer goods in its online marketplace. Amazon also manufactures some 
items themselves, such as the E-book reader Kindle and the home assistant 
software Alexa that is being integrated into various devices, such as internet 
connected speakers similar to what Google is offering.108 This case will only 
look into the product marketplace Amazon.com and more specifically, the 
way that Amazon’s search engine delivers results to users. According to 
Amazon itself, personal data is an important part of their business.109 It uses 
personal data for a number of reasons, including helping sellers on their 
online marketplace with promotional offers.110 This will be an important 
                                                
108 See for instance:  
https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B06Y5ZW72J/ref=gw_aucc_rd_spring_v2?pf_rd_p=bebcc8
48-1db5-41ef-9a14-96633882cc25&pf_rd_r=43ET3R69K5RV83Z9TX32 and 
https://store.google.com/ca/product/google_home.  
109 See: 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_v4_sib?ie=UTF8&n
odeId=201909010 under the headline ”Does Amazon.co.uk share the information it 
receives?”. 
110 See: 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_v4_sib?ie=UTF8&n
odeId=201909010 under the headline ”Does Amazon.co.uk share the information it 
receives?”, point 3. 
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factor when considering second-line abuse of dominance later on in this 
case. 
 
5.2 Amazons relevant market 
Depending on how you interpret Amazon’s business in general it could be 
placed in many markets. According to the Google Shopping decision, 
Amazon is, at least, in the market for online marketplaces.111 Key indicators 
for that market are that the marketplace is not sorely selling its own products 
but rather serves as a platform for other companies to sell its products on. 
There is also some kind of product search present and an integrated 
payment, delivery and product return functionality.112 The requirement for a 
search engine could be debated since that conclusion is based on the 
Commissions views of the differences between a comparison shopping 
service and an online marketplace although it would be hard to imagine an 
online store of any kind without a search engine built into it. On the other 
hand, Amazon could be seen as an online retailer as well considering that 
they make and sell products of their own. The difference between an online 
retailer and an online merchant seems to be the origins of the products that 
are for sale.113 There are, however, indications that could point to e-
commerce, defined as all kinds of selling things from an online store 
regardless of who’s objects that are for sale, being a relevant market in 
itself.114 This definition would essentially put online retailers such as 
HM.com, Inkclub.com and others alongside online marketplaces such as 
Cdon.com, E-bay.com and Amazon.com. For the sake of this case study I 
will assume that online marketplaces as outlined by the Commission 
constitute a relevant product market as a subcategory within the e-commerce 
definition and that the geographical dimension of that market constitutes the 
European Union as a whole. The reason for this being that online retailers 
                                                
111 Google Shopping Decision, note 219. 
112 Google Shopping Decision, note 220. 
113 Google Shopping Decision, note 210. 
114 See for instance: https://www.recode.net/2017/10/24/16534100/amazon-market-share-
ebay-walmart-apple-ecommerce-sales-2017 
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such as HM.com generally have a much narrower product field mainly 
consisting of their own brand products while online marketplaces such as 
Amazon.com focus their efforts on filling its marketplace with other 
companies products. This also has the potential to put Amazon.com in a 
position where they can control competition on their own marketplace. 
 
5.3 Is Amazon dominant in its market? 
When considering the criteria used to assess dominance outlined in chapter 
3.3.5. we have to examine the amazons market share in the market for 
online marketplaces. Data from the US market would suggest that amazon is 
indeed dominant in that geographical market, holding around to 43% of the 
relevant market.115 Statistics from Europe suggests that Amazon has a 
strong market position.116 The assessment of market share in Europe for this 
kind of business is difficult because of the nature of online retail in itself. 
The marketplace is accessible for anyone regardless of geographical 
location and given the nature of the internal market in the EU, goods are 
easily sent across borders, which means that some of the sales reported for 
Germany in the European statistics might, in fact, be sent to other markets. 
There is also evidence that Amazon is indeed dominant in some markets, 
especially the market for E-books. The Commission took action against 
Amazon regarding some clauses in their distribution agreement for E-
books.117 In this case the Commission held the view that Amazon was 
dominant in the market for electronically distributed books, that is enjoying 
a position in which it could act independently of its competitors. For the 
sake of this example, I will assume that Amazon would be considered 
dominant in the market for online marketplaces. 
 
 
                                                
115 See: https://www.recode.net/2017/10/24/16534100/amazon-market-share-ebay-walmart-
apple-ecommerce-sales-2017.  
116 See: https://www.fungglobalretailtech.com/research/identifying-e-commerce-winners-
the-fung-global-retail-technology-internet-retailers-ranking-for-western-europe/  
117 Summary of the Commissions decision in Case AT.40153 E-book MFNS and related 
matters, notes 9-11 
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5.4 Outcomes of dominance 
5.4.1 External perspective 
Companies enjoying dominant positions are typically necessary business 
partners for other companies. The Commission decision against Amazon’s 
E-book business shows that Amazon was such an important outlet for E-
books that it could impose very aggressive conditions on its distribution 
agreements. Given that Amazon, at least in this case, is dominant in the 
market for online marketplaces it would typically have to be careful not to 
apply dissimilar conditions to its trading partners, or using other clauses to 
limit the competition in the market for online marketplaces. In the context of 
the market for online marketplaces it is fair to assume that the main priority 
for an investigation by the Commission would be focused on the terms for 
market entry, similar to the E-book case. However, the online marketplace 
market is typically a multi sided market, where Amazon and its competitors 
needs to attract enough sellers to be relevant for the consumers, and also 
attract enough consumers to be relevant to the sellers. This opens up for 
another perspective on distortion of competition. 
 
5.4.2 Internal perspective 
The main goal for Amazon is to connect buyers and sellers within its 
marketplace, where sellers compete for customers on terms essentially 
curated by amazon in a similar way as the search results within PageRank is 
curated by Google.118 In the Google Shopping Case this meant that the 
commission put emphasis on Google, the curator of its search results, not to 
distort competition by curating its search results in certain ways. If this is an 
obligation that applies to all businesses that are dominant in their relevant 
market, and operate a search engine to deliver value to their customers, it 
                                                
118 See for instance https://www.aboutamazon.com/supporting-small-businesses/small-
business-impact-report . 
 37 
could mean that Amazon has an obligation not to discriminate between 
retailers on its marketplace. Amazon makes no secret about that it uses the 
data it collects about its customers, that is those who buy stuff from amazon, 
to better promote products or services. These promotions can have an 
impact on what product the consumer choses to buy. Considering the overall 
goal of competition regulation, being the promotion of consumer welfare 
defined as the situation when the consumer receives the monetary surplus 
that the efficiency gains a competitive market brings, the way Amazon 
curates choice for consumers, and manages competition among its sellers 
might not be aligned to that goal. This approach to consumer data and the 
curating of its own marketplace can be exemplified by using the same 
search term in Amazons product search engine, in this case the search term 
“mehano train” which refers to a toy train set by a specific manufacturer. 
The search term was entered in an anonymous browser window and as a 
returning customer and yielded quite different results as shown in figures 1 
and 2 in appendix A. Moreover, Amazon also curates different sellers for 
specific products, tending to promote their own “amazon prime” shipping 
options over other shipping options as shown in figures 3 and 4 in appendix 
A. In relation to the consumer welfare objective, the cheapest option 
probably should be listed first. This practise could be comparable with how 
Google curated its PageRank algorithm to push competing comparison 
shopping services further down the search results. Another aspect of the 
internal perspective is that it is increasingly hard to assess what the actual 
undistorted market within the online marketplace actually is due to the 
degree of personalization within the search results as illustrated by figures 1 
and 2 in appendix A. 
 
5.5 Analysis of the Amazon case 
Although this look into Amazon’s online marketplace business is based on 
assumptions rather than hard facts it shows how the principles laid out in the 
Google Shopping Case might affect other online businesses. A major 
difference between the Google Shopping Case and Amazon as a whole is, of 
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course, that both buyers and sellers on the Amazon platform has agreed to 
the terms and conditions when entering that marketplace while there is no 
such process when being listed with Google’s general Internet search 
engine. However, the idea that you can agree on entering a market situation 
where the market operator, in this case Amazon, curates the conditions for 
competition in that market does not make competition law any less 
applicable. If Google’s way of curating its search results to allegedly 
promote its own comparison shopping service is a breach of antitrust law, 
then Amazons curating of its online marketplace to promote certain sellers 
probably is too, given the conditions that it holds a dominant position in the 
market for online marketplaces. 
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6 Conclusions 
In the light of the Commissions decision in Google Shopping I think it is 
safe to say that EU competition policy is in need of reformation to keep up 
with the fast paced developments of online platforms, such as Google and 
Amazon. The Commissions inability to, in my view, properly recognize the 
principal characteristic of online business, that is constant change, is a 
setback to this field of law and makes for a less predictable legal 
environment. The Commission refrains from using established terminology 
in this decision. Google’s general Internet search is not an essential facility, 
nor is the conduct tying, bundling or refusal to deal. Google is simply 
dominant, and therefore they must be doing something abusive. In my 
opinion the Commissions decision has a protectionist aura, and as pointed 
out in the chapter four analysis, might put an end to innovation at the cost of 
consumer welfare. I fear that the Commissions decision might open up for 
more claims of abuse by other competing services, such as Vimeo. On the 
bright side have we yet to see what effects the General Data Protection 
Regulation119 has on competition policy and the use of personal data. As 
mentioned in the introduction, in a functioning competitive environment 
market transparency is an essential feature. The case study of Amazon 
highlights this, and also demonstrates that the perhaps most powerful tool 
for the future of competition policy is now in the hands of consumers, not 
the Commission. 
                                                
119 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natrual persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC. 
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Appendix A 
Figure 1. Search results from anonymous browsing. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Search results from a returning customer. 
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Figure 3, a specific product with more than one seller. 
 
 
 
Figure 4, seller ranking within that product. 
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